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Abstract
This article examines the relations between the European Parliament (EP) and civil society organizations (CSOs) in the EU’s
legislative process. It focuses specifically on legislative trilogues, an informal institution bringing together the representa-
tives of the EP, Council, and Commission in a secluded setting to conclude legislative agreements. Trilogues have become
the modus operandi and an absolutely pivotal part of the EU law-making process: they are where the deals are made.
While secluded decision-making offers plenty of opportunities for EU institutions to depoliticize law-making, we argue
that trilogues have become politicized, partly from the relationship between the EP and CSOs. We flesh out this argument
on the basis of insights from the politicization and the historical institutionalist literatures, advance two ideal types of tri-
logue politics, and explore these types on the basis of a preliminary examination of a comprehensive interview material.
Keywords
civil society organisations; European Parliament; institutionalism; law-making; legislative process; politicisation; trilogues
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Out of the Shadows, Into the Limelight: Parliaments and Politicisation”, edited by Christine
Neuhold (Maastricht University, The Netherlands) and Guri Rosén (University of Oslo, Norway).
© 2019 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
‘Trilogues’ are the EU’s word for an in-camera, three-way
negotiation between the main legislative institutions,
the European Parliament (EP), Council of Ministers, and
Commission, aimed at reaching legislative agreements.
They have no references in the EU treaties, but a substan-
tial majority of EU legislation go to trilogues (Brandsma,
2015), mostly resulting in inter-institutional first reading
(or early-second) agreement (EP, 2017a). While this form
of policy-making has facilitated EU law-making, it poten-
tially achieves this by de-politicising issues, given the se-
cluded setting, the premium on bargaining, and the im-
portance of technical negotiations (Stie, 2012).
Even so, trilogues have been the object of a growing
public debate, fuelled in particular by discontentment in
the EP and negative press coverage (EU Observer, 2014;
International New York Times, 2014), and leading to the
involvement of the EuropeanOmbudsman and the Court
of Justice of the EU (CJEU). The European Ombudsman
and the CJEU have now made it clear that trilogues are
a pivotal part of the law-making process of the EU—it
is ‘where deals are made’—subject to the same trans-
parency requirements that the other phases of the EU
law-making process. Thus, willy-nilly, trilogues have en-
tered a new phase of their institutional life cycle, char-
acterized by the end of the permissive consensus and
the emergence of restraining dissensus (to paraphrase
Hooghe & Marks, 2009).
In this article, we examine how trilogues have be-
come a politicized law-making institution. Our premise is
that the contemporary debate on the transparency of tri-
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logues represents the tip of the iceberg of amore gradual
process of politicization, initiated from within. Our work-
ing hypothesis is that the EP is the main driver of this
process, politicizing an otherwise closed and rather tech-
nical set of negotiations by relying on a broad range of
civil society organizations (CSO), although especially non-
governmental organizations (NGOs)1. Given the early
state of research on trilogues, our focus is on sketch-
ing out a theoretical argument through which to grasp
the politicization of trilogues, and to outline very prelim-
inary evidence.
Theoretically, we develop a perspective combin-
ing insights from recent works on the politicization of
European integration and from historical institutional-
ism. While the politicization literature is rapidly becom-
ing the main frame of reference on this topic in EU af-
fairs and can help us conceptualize politicization as an
EU phenomenon, we need to supplement its overriding
focus on the public sphere with an account of politiciza-
tion from within (institutions). Historical institutionalism
is well-suited to do this because it is based on an under-
standing of institutions as instantiations of power and
the result of political compromises, and because it offers
a complementary understanding of change as an endoge-
nous process.
Empirically, the difficulty of studying trilogues is to
access data, given the closed and rather informal char-
acter of this phenomenon. Barring the option of partic-
ipant observation, to which we did not have access, al-
ternatives are to rely on content analysis of legislation
(Laloux & Delreux, 2018) or on interviews with EU practi-
tioners. We chose the latter research strategy given our
interest in probing the relationship between the EP and
CSOs. The data upon which we draw in this study are
part of a broader dataset ofmore than 87 interviewswith
EU practitioners, collected for the purpose of a larger re-
search project focusing on information flows between
EU lawmakers and CSOs in trilogues. The interviewees
are both trilogue ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, where insid-
ers are those who participated in trilogues, or are in-
volved in institutional preparation for trilogues, whereas
outsiders are those who have no official access to the tri-
logue process.
In this article, we focus on a sub-set of interviews
(interviews with CSOs) and provide insights from an ex-
ploratory foray into the empirical material. These inter-
views help us flesh out ideal types of relationships be-
tween the EP and CSOs, arrived at through a distilla-
tion and extrapolations of the findings of the EU lobby-
ing literature.
2. The Case for Studying Trilogue Politicization
The role of CSOs in the EU political system is well-
documented. A range of CSOs, comprising producer or-
ganisations and NGOs: supply EU institutions with tech-
nical (Warleigh, 2000) and political information; act as
political supporters and messengers where there is com-
mon cause; aggregate and articulate interests (Albareda
& Braun, 2019); represent concentrated interest con-
stituencies or act as a proxy for a diffuse and often dis-
engaged civil society (Greenwood, 2017; Klüver, 2013;
Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 2013). Their role is particularly
important in EU policymaking because much EU legisla-
tion is regulatory in nature, requiring extensive technical
information, placing a premiumon those able to supply it
in a convenient format. In the EU, it has long been recog-
nised that access to every-day policymaking is depen-
dent upon the supply of information (Chalmers, 2019;
Klüver, Braun, & Beyers, 2015; Mazey & Richardson,
1993). Strikingly, we know very little about the role of
CSOs in trilogues. The bulk of the literature has focused
on the other parts of the EU policy cycle: agenda-setting;
policy formulation; and implementation. By contrast, the
decision-making phase remains understudied, and the
trilogue phase is a blind spot in the research agenda.
Yet, there is no reason why the flows of information
between EU lawmakers and organized interests should
stop during the highly pivotal trilogue phase. Trilogues
typically last for a six-month period and involve an aver-
age of three ‘political’ level inter-institutional meetings
(Brandsma, 2015, 2018), during which time a range of
lobbyists seek information about the progress of discus-
sions, and, where possible, to influence the detail of pro-
posals which challenge their position. A notable excep-
tion is the case study by Andlovic and Lehmann (2014).
In this study of aviation emissions trading, the authors
provide evidence of industry group lobbying of the EP
(‘individualMembers of the European Parliament [MEPs]
from certain member states, supposedly most affected
by the implementation of the directive’), resulting in and
that, in turn, ‘these MEPs, having detailed knowledge
of the directive, were instrumental in the last stages of
the trilogues’ (Andlovic & Lehmann, 2014, p. 813; our
emphasis). Other studies have likewise suggested that
trilogues tend to privilege producer interests at the ex-
pense of other types of interests (Burns, Carter, Davies,
& Worsfold, 2013; Dionigi & Koop, 2017). But we know
remarkably little about how CSOs connect with the tri-
logue process, and whether systematic biases are built
into trilogues.
It is thus time we addressed this lacunamore system-
atically. We propose to do so by developing a framework
of understanding combining insights from the EU-related
politicization literature and from the more general com-
parative politics literature on historical institutionalism.
3. Trilogue Politicization: A Historical Institutionalist
Perspective
There has been a surge in academic interest in the politi-
cization of European integration. In 2009, Hooghe and
Marks argued that European integration had entered a
new phase at the turn of the 1990s, as a result of a deep-
1 In this article, we draw a distinction between two types of CSOs: producer associations and NGOs.
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ening of the integration process (i.e., the establishment
of the EU in the Treaty of Maastricht). ‘Permissive con-
sensus’ was paving the way to ‘restraining dissensus’ as
European integration became a more salient issue in do-
mestic politics and the object of growing partisan con-
troversies (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). The crises of the
2010s, the rise of Euroskepticism, and the Brexit referen-
dum have shown that European integration is no longer
‘for elites only’ (Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2016). Broader
European publics mobilize on EU issues in ways that can
have important consequences.
From the rapidly growing literature on politicization,
two main insights are relevant here. The first concerns
the definition of politicization as an observable phe-
nomenon comprising three main dimensions: ‘1) the
growing salience of European governance…2) a polar-
isation of opinion, and 3) an expansion of actors and
audiences engaged in monitoring EU affairs’ (De Wilde,
Leupold, & Schmidtke, 2016). The second concerns the
extraordinary differentiated character of politicization.
Politicization takes many shapes and forms, it has many
objects, and it is driven by a range of factors rather than,
as originally assumed, the universal manifestation of the
deepening of European integration and transfer of au-
thority to the EU (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012). Accounts of
politicization must therefore start with a careful speci-
fication of the phenomenon under study, not least the
arena in which it is observed. Baglioni and Hurrelmann
(2016, p. 106), for example, propose a simple distinction
between three arenas of politicization: a citizen arena,
where ‘laypeople engage in politics’; an intermediary
arena, where we find participants with a professional in-
terest in politics (political parties, interest groups, me-
dias); and an institutional arena, which is at ‘the core’ of
the political system and is populated by politicians from,
e.g., the EP and national parliaments.
Drawing on this first stand of scholarship, we can
specify the conceptual underpinnings of our research
question as follows. Paraphrasing De Wilde et al. (2016),
by politicization of trilogues, we mean the process by
which actors in the trilogue negotiations highlight the
salience of individual issues, create controversies, or
expand the range of actors and audiences engaged in
monitoring EU affairs. Our inquiry is located squarely
within the institutional arena, in fact at the heart of the
machine-room of EU law-making where deals are made,
and where we can expect EU institutions to revert to de-
politicization strategies. Indeed we know that:
When a policy decision point approaches, but clashes
between rival advocacy coalitions cause impasse, the
EU’s natural propensity is to depoliticize issues and
‘push’ them back to the sub-systematic level [of ex-
pert committees and professional networks] for quiet
resolution. (Peterson, 2001, p. 309)
While the politicization perspective helps us pinpoint the
pivotal significance of trilogue decision-making in light
of EU institutions’ propensity to depoliticize issues, tri-
logues also bring us to the outer limits of what this per-
spective can help us make sense of. Indeed, how can
it possibly make sense to talk about issue saliency in
trilogue negotiations, when a proper public is missing?
And how can it possibly make sense to talk about actor
and audience expansion in trilogues when these negoti-
ations are closed and only involve a fixed set of institu-
tional actors?
In order to make sense of these questions, we must
understand what institutions are and how intrinsic con-
flict is to their formation and functioning: in other words,
we need to retrieve a few basic insights from historical
institutionalism. According to historical institutionalism,
institutions are more or less solidified power struggles
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Waylen, 2014). They emerge
from power struggles, and are nothing else than po-
litical compromises that make orderly politics possible.
But unlike other political compromises, for example on
policy issues, the political compromises creating institu-
tions are more structural insofar as they set the parame-
ters for a whole range of subsequent (policy) decisions
(Moe, 2005). Besides establishing an intimate link be-
tween institutions and power, historical institutionalism
also makes it possible to understand change, and there-
fore also politicization. The important insight in this re-
spect is that change is endogenous to institutions, be-
cause institutions are never ‘cohesive and equilibrating’
and therefore ‘power, contestation and distributional is-
sues [must be] at the center’ of the analysis (Waylen,
2014, p. 216).
Viewing trilogues as an institution, we argue that a
key conflict enabling this institution to emerge in the
first place was a power conflict between Council and
the EP. This conflict has been rooted in the redistribu-
tion of power between the EP and Council, as illustrated
by the long-term constitutional empowerment of the EP
(Rittberger & Schimmelfennig, 2006). In the early years
of co-decision, Council soon learned that it could not
‘just’ ignore the EP’s legislative position by reintroducing
its common position after failure to reach an agreement
in conciliation (Shackleton, 2000; Shackleton & Raunio,
2003). Under the Council’s impulse, trilogues emerged
in 1994 as a means of paving the way for a more pre-
dictable process by building confidence between Council
and the EP. Since then, they have been defined by the
clashing narratives of efficiency (Council) on the one
hand, and institutional and partisan empowerment (EP)
on the other hand. Contrary to the Council narrative
on trilogues, most MEPs today see trilogue secrecy and
seclusion as away to politicize—not depoliticize—EU law-
making by bringing salient issues to bear at the heart
of the law-making machine room (Roederer-Rynning &
Greenwood, 2019). This narrative builds upon an EP self-
understanding as the ‘tribune of the people’, in contrast
to views of the Council as the ‘creature of the member
states’. The result of this clash is that trilogues are an in-
herently unstable, or dynamic, institution, containing in
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its very heart the seeds of politicization. Below,we sketch
out two main potential paths ensuing from this unstable
power gameandmeeting of cultures between the EP and
Council in trilogues. Beforewe do this, however, we trace
how the EP has sought to bring secluded trilogues more
into line with established standards of democratic law-
making. Trilogue reform in the EP shows that, while the
EP is a force of change, it is also affected by its own inter-
nal dissensions.
4. The EP and Trilogue Reform: Internal Dissension and
Reform Push
Figure 1 captures the picture of relief and common en-
deavour as a deal is reached in trilogue negotiations
following intensive (sometimes all-night) negotiations,
with senior figures in attendance from each of the
EU institutions.
In reality, the team negotiating for the EP with the
Council of Ministers will have a small number of ‘red
lines’, generally salient issues with public recognition,
whilst willing to give way to the Council on technical
details of legislative files which are difficult to make
accessible for public debate (Greenwood & Roederer-
Rynning, 2014).
Given its directly elected mandate, the EP has been
the most sensitive of the three EU institutions to the im-
plications of trilogues for its democratic legitimacy. For
this reason, it has developed a series of measures in its
Rules of Procedure (RoPs) aimed at the oversight of ar-
rangements. RoPs are relatively politicised, and the re-
sult of extensive deliberation in the EP. Current RoP al-
low for four levels of oversight in trilogues. First, as re-
gards trilogues, the Committee’s position on a legisla-
tive file is always public. Secondly, plenary has the abil-
ity to overturn a Committee’s recommendation to open
trilogue negotiations, a procedure triggered in the first
instance by just one-tenth of members. Third, there is
pluralisation of participation, in that there is a negoti-
ating team for the EP comprising the Rapporteur and
Shadow Rapporteurs from the different political parties,
with the Committee Chair or Vice-Chair present, and po-
litical party advisors in attendance at trilogue meetings.
These attendees ensure that the EP always has a numer-
ical majority in meetings, and the reforms have collec-
tively given political trilogues the semblance of formal-
ity with echoes of the now (almost) defunct Conciliation
Committees (Figure 2).
A fourth level of oversight provided for by the RoP
is that the team must report back to Committee on the
progress of trilogue negotiations.
These rules allow for some degree of publicity
throughout the trilogue process, but are not without
problems. One first problem is linked to implementation
of these rules. In practice, it turns out for example that
the report back in Commission is often perfunctory or
non-existent (Brandsma, 2018). Another problem is that
the final stage where the Committee presents its posi-
tion to plenary is often a fait accompli, with plenary re-
luctant to intervene in what is presented as carefully
crafted and fragile agreementsmadebetween the knowl-
edgeable negotiating team and the other EU institutions,
which in turn are presented as having limited room for
manoeuvre. Finally, lack of access to key trilogue docu-
ments has generated ongoing internal rumblings in the
EP,which resulted in a keynote lawsuit against the EP, and
was undoubtedly a factor in the Ombudsman’s decision
to open an own-initiative inquiry into the transparency
of trilogues.
In 2018, the ruling of the CJEU on the De Capitani
case (Case T-540/15) annulled a decision of the EP to
refuse to grant Mr Emilio De Capitani, a retired for-
mer EP administrator, full access to trilogue documents.
The EU institutions had argued that release of the doc-
Figure 1.Mission accomplished: Agreement at the end of a trilogue meeting. Source: Weston (2018).
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Figure 2. A trilogue in process. Source: EP (2017b).
uments were covered by an exception in the Access
to Documents Regulation (1049/2001) involving inter-
nal preparatory documents, whereas the Court found
that the EU institutions’ very restrictive interpretation of
the principles of publicity and transparency in trilogues,
amounted to a ‘general presumption of non-disclosure’.
Moreover, the Court recognised the position of trilogues
as a regular part of the legislative procedure, something
the Council had disputed, and therefore subject toArticle
12 of Regulation 10/2001 which provides for proac-
tive publication in a register of documents (Emiliano
De Capitani v. European Parliament, 2018; Roederer-
Rynning & Greenwood, 2019; Interview 87). Similarly,
the Ombudsman framed a critical decision about tri-
logues (European Ombudsman, 2016) around the citi-
zens’ right to participate in EU public policymaking, spec-
ified in Articles 10 (3) and 11 (1–3) of the Treaty on EU,
and Article 15(1) of the Treaty on Functioning of the EU
(TFEU), noting the pre-requisite of transparency to facil-
itate participation. The Ombudsman, in her report, had
asked the institutions to publish a list of documents, if
not proactively (the preferred option among trilogue ac-
tivists) at least retrospectively, and to construct a joint
trilogue database.
Both the keynote De Capitani ruling and the
Ombudsman’s report seem set to change the trilogue in-
stitutions. At the time ofwriting, the institutions have yet
to change practice, but the direction of travel towards
more transparency in trilogues is clearly founded in the
decisions of the General Court and the Ombudsman.
5. In the ‘Shadow of Public Opinion’: Two Types of
Trilogue Politics
Based on the above conceptualization of trilogue politi-
cization and a cursory overview of how the EP has
pushed for trilogue reform, we can now elaborate two
ideal-types of trilogue politics. These trilogue types syn-
thesize the insights of the abundant literature on EU
lobbying, within the above delineated framework of tri-
logue politicization.
5.1. The EP as a ‘Responsive’ Legislator
The first type of trilogue politics corresponds to situa-
tions where the EP uses its participation in the trilogue
process to champion diffuse interests and thus pluralize,
or in the terminology adopted in this article politicize, the
deal-making phase. Given its popular mandate, the EP
has traditionally been cast as the most ‘responsive’ of all
three policy-making institutions to NGOs which claim to
articulate ‘diffuse’ or public interests (Earnshaw & Judge,
2011; Judge, 1992; Pollack, 1997). The ability of social
movements and NGOs to politicise issues and apparently
turn the position of the EP is captured in the literature
by case studies (Dür & Mateo, 2014). In turn, we know
that the EP has stepped up efforts at producing policy ex-
pertise, as a part of its broader strategy to develop insti-
tutional autonomy from the Commission and Council. It
has also helped to stimulate the formation of NGOs (such
as ‘Finance Watch’) where no counterweight to sectoral
business interests exist, in an attempt to balance the sup-
ply of information. And for highly salient issues the EP
still adopts public facing positions, reflecting its appetite
for issues that are highly politicised. The orientation of
the EP towards CSOs and particular types of CSOs may
nevertheless vary by committee and their role in a partic-
ular legislative file (Brandsma, 2015; Dionigi, 2019; Ripoll
Servent, 2018).
While the literature does not deal with trilogues
specifically but co-decision in general, we can expect to
find close and mutually reinforcing ties between the EP
and NGOs in trilogues. NGOs find in the EP an ally ready
to politicize trilogues. In return, the EP can assert itself
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through the ‘noisy’ politics of NGOs. Trilogues offer the
EP negotiating team a possibility to extract concessions
from a usually more conservative Council by politicizing
the negotiations. The EP has two main levers at its dis-
posal: 1) trilogues give all EP groups a seat in the negotia-
tions, which maximizes the chance that a plurality of (dif-
fuse) interests are represented and informed along the
way; 2) the EP negotiating team can use ‘the shadow of
public opinion’ as a source of pressure during the trilogue
negotiations. As one EP participant put it, ‘it boils down
to public pressure. If they had said, it’s not important,
then we could have scandalized’ (interview quote, as
cited in Greenwood & Roederer-Rynning, 2014, p. 334).
5.2. The EP as a ‘Responsible’ Legislator
In the second type of trilogue politics, the EP has be-
come more ‘responsible’ with the acquisition of legisla-
tive powers,which has prompted it tomoderate its policy
claims and expectations. There are two main potential
explanations. One is that, with increased legislative pow-
ers, the EP has become more ‘realistic’ in its demands
because it becomes more attentive to the political impli-
cations of its preferences and more sensitive to the po-
litical realities at hand (Jacqué, 2009; Rasmussen, 2014).
Another is that legislative empowerment has made the
EP much more dependent on fine-grained expertise. In
turn, this is expected to give business interests greater
political clout in the EP (Burson-Marsteller, 2009; Coen &
Katsaitis, 2019; Dür& de Bièvre, 2007).We call this thesis
the ‘mirror thesis’ to highlight the idea that a more pow-
erful EP, according to this thesis, increasingly ‘reflects it-
self’ in the Council, adopting Council standards of appro-
priateness and procedural norms (need to compromise,
need to have a realistic view of the problem at hand,
need to ‘behave responsibly’) at the expense of its own
policy preferences (Ripoll Servent, 2013). What legisla-
tive empowerment does is thus to turn the EP as a sec-
ond Council.
While the literature focuses on co-decision in gen-
eral, we can hypothesize that trilogues tend to place the
EP in a situation of an even greater dependence—rather
than increased bargaining power—for two reasons. First,
the acceleration of the pace of the negotiation makes
it critical for the EP to have access to reliable expertise.
Themore the negotiations advance, themore critical the
need for swift and fine-grained expertise. Second, the
fact that the chief implementation expertise is located
within the Council (member state bureaucracies) makes
the EP vulnerable to Council criticisms on behalf of the
‘irresponsible’ or ‘unrealistic’ character of EP demands
as the tedious process of working systematically through
the EP amendments begins in trilogues. Council comes
to trilogues after a long phase of internal work, during
which the member states together with the Commission
in reality fine-combed the legislative proposal of the
Commission and theproposedCouncil amendmentswith
a view to discussing their added value and technical feasi-
bility. The EP comes to trilogues lacking not only internal
expertise on policy implementation but also lacking the
intensive Commission scrutiny of its proposed amend-
ments. Trilogues are thus, a ‘reality check’ for the EP, lit-
erally as well as figuratively. Consequently, this scenario
implies that trilogues inaugurate a phase during which
NGOs are structurally disadvantaged relative to other
types of CSOs, because: 1) they will be perceived as un-
helpful allies, politicizing negotiations at a timewhen leg-
islators are focused on compromise and de-politicization;
and 2) they are less likely to provide the kind of swift
and detailed expertise that is crucially needed in the fi-
nal phases of the trilogue negotiations.
6. Preliminary Insights
One of the key problems with trilogue research is the dif-
ficulty to find reliable and accessible data. This problem is
naturally tied to the secluded and still informal nature of
the negotiations. Ideally, we would have carried out par-
ticipant observation, but since this option was not open,
we settled for interviews with EU lawmakers. Long past
are the days when interviews were seen as a second best
in qualitative research. Interviews can give a multiplic-
ity of deep insights into a process, which some ethnog-
raphers have captured by the term ‘ethnographic inter-
views’ (Rubow, 2003; Spradley, 1979). Drawing on this
method, which we describe elsewhere, we undertook 87
interviews between June 2017 and January 2019 with
the full range of CSOs (producer organisations, consul-
tancies, NGOs), Permanent Representations (PERMREP),
MEPs, their assistants, political party advisors in the EP,
and a former member of the EP secretariat, aimed at in-
vestigating the role of CSOs in trilogues (Table 1). In this
article, we report preliminary insights into trilogue politi-
cization by drawing on the sub-set of interviews with
CSOs, and discuss potential links with the two ideal-type
models of trilogue politics. Four observations strike us.
6.1. Information as Currency of Power
Interviews highlighted the (well-known) fact that infor-
mation is the currency of power in Brussels. One of the
producer participants in our study, a trade union, re-
peated many times during the course of interview that
‘You can always access the information you need if you
have an office in Brussels’ (Interview 2). An office pro-
vides the means to establish and maintain regular net-
works, but also the opportunity to develop expertise
as to the stage of the legislative process from where
information can be accessed. One MEPs Assistant re-
flected that:
Thosewith the best contacts get themost information,
and information is power…thosewith the staff can find
the information in a public database, but where infor-
mation is not published then it is down to contacts—
this is the stereotype of the EU. There needs to be a
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Table 1. Interviewees.
Trilogue insiders Trilogue outsiders
PERMREP 12 Civil Society Organisations 38*
Large countries 2 NGOs
Medium countries 7 Trade Unions 16 (15)
Small countries 3 Producer Associations 2 (1)
20 (19)
EP: 30 Other 6
MEPs (5 parties, 7 committees) 13 Public Affairs Consultancies 3
Party Advisors (same affiliations as MEPs) 11 European Ombudsman’s office
Assistants to MEPs 4 Territorial governmental representative organization 1
2 Mr Emilio De Capitani 1
Total 42 45
Note: * Number of CSOs at EU level in parenthesis.
one-stop shop for information where it is published.
Info needs to be given to everyone. (Interview 37)
6.2. Written Information Sources
A producer association referred to accessing the ‘out-
come of proceedings’, a kind of (lesser known) unofficial
minutes from Council Working Parties (Interview 63). An
NGO also referred to these, emphasising a common pool
of expertise among professionalised civil society organ-
isations, whether producer or NGO (Interview 44). The
Council register was seen as the best tool: ‘I check every
morning the Council register, and go through line-by-line
the documents that are important for us’ (Interview 45).
Some producer related associations received some lim-
ited trilogue related logistical information (such as the
announcement of a forthcoming trilogue) through spe-
cialised subscription sources such as Dods, One Policy
Place and EU Issue Tracker, as well as generalised me-
dia sources, though subscription services do not extend
to obtaining trilogue documents or political information
(Interview 12). Among the generalised media sources,
Politico was seen as heralding something of a revolution
since its arrival on the Brussels scene in 2014, though hav-
ing the effect of ‘making PERMREPS go back into their
shell’ (Interview 70). Of these written sources, only the
Council register is publicly available—all others have to
be accessed through one form of contacts with trilogue
insiders. Trilogue documents were seen as particularly
difficult to obtain during the latter stages of a trilogue,
irrespective of the type of civil society organisation, be-
cause of the speed at which the decision-making process
moved at that stage (Interview 68).
6.3. Information Supply and Demand
The view as to the availability of information for those
with a Brussels office was generally shared across pro-
ducer organizations as well as NGOs, particularly among
the well-staffed environmental NGOs, but also among
many of the smaller NGOs (Interview 44). Nonetheless,
there was almost universal agreement among civil soci-
ety organisations that information could be obtained by
exchanging information or value added analysis, includ-
ing counter arguments. These factors generally relate to
the supply of information, but demand for information
from EU institutions was also a key factor. A PERMREP
from a smaller country confided that ‘there are domains
wherewedon’t have great expertise, such asAudioVisual
and IT, and our lack of expertise in some subjects makes
us attractive targets for lobbying’ (Interview 12). Access
to information about trilogues was generally available
through the return favour of providing value added anal-
ysis (Interview 51), and political and technical informa-
tion, and where the CSO was going in the same direction
of travel as the institutional actor in question (Interview
74). The ability to acquire information quickly enough in
order to make an intervention during the course of tri-
logues was seen as related to the ability to provide suffi-
cient added value to a contact (Interview 51).
6.4. Dislike of Trilogue Un-Transparency
There was a common dislike of the lack of transparency
of trilogues and the need to obtain information about
legislative progress through informal sources, indicating
the limited extent to which these sources could deliver
information in sufficient time to be able to follow the
trilogue process in full in order to make interventions; if
there is dissatisfaction about the supply of information, it
indicates that organisations don’t have sufficient advan-
tage to be able to keep it all to themselves. This across
the board dislike was also evident in the responses to the
European Ombudsman’s public consultation on trilogues
(European Ombudsman, 2016).
6.5. CSOs as Emissaries
Not infrequently, NGOs reported being agents of political
communication between the institutions; for one NGO,
‘it happens all the time that we are political emissaries
of the EP with the Council. I was almost negotiating for
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the negotiator in one case’ (Interview 50). Seen this way,
civil society organisations which articulate public—and
sometimes private—interests, can play a role in politicis-
ing issues in an otherwise closed policy-making system.
Whilst CSOs can become drawn into the world of confi-
dentiality in their quest for information, making it diffi-
cult for them to release information obtained in leaked
documents, they can also stimulate public discussion of
issues circulating in the ‘Brussels bubble’.
6.6. Speed as Important as Secrecy
Even business organisations with extensive networks
find it difficult to keep track of the pace of trilogue negoti-
ations, particularlywhere this speeds up towards the end
of a file. ‘Toomany, too quick’, and ‘we struggle to get the
information’ at the late stages (Interview 77), explained
one. For the public affairs consultancies, with their estab-
lished networks, however, ‘we don’t lack access to infor-
mation. It’s not my view that the external interests say
that they lack information’ (Interview 83).
It is clear that information—the currency of power in
Brussels—about trilogues is available to civil society or-
ganisations with an office in Brussels. Nonetheless, com-
plaints about the lack of transparency of trilogues indi-
cate a limited ability to make interventions. Public af-
fairs consultancies, with their extensive networks, seem
to be most capable of acquiring information about the
progress of trilogues, which is then passed on to a sub-
stantially business orientated clientele. For most civil so-
ciety organisations, information becomesmuchmore dif-
ficult to obtain the further down the pathway trilogues
go, where EU institutions are intensively searching for
consensus and external input becomes unhelpful. For
some CSOs, information obtained during the trilogue
process constrains their ability to politicise issues, on
the basis that it is privileged information (Interview 44).
These factors lean towards the view of the EP as a ‘re-
sponsible’ legislator. However, the ‘information for analy-
sis’ thesis tends towards the view of the EP as a respon-
sive legislator, sensitive to the information and perspec-
tives which civil society organisations bring. Where civil
society organisations are going in the same direction of
travel as EU institutions, so they form a natural alliance,
supporting the viewof the Parliament as a responsive leg-
islator, where information flows freely between the par-
ties. NGOs are more likely to perform this role where EU
institutions seek more stringent regulation, but business
organisations too can have their own reasons for seek-
ing more stringent regulation. Civil society organisations
can then perform a role in lobbying the Council, and, oc-
casionally, vice-versa, as foreseen in institutionalist ac-
counts of the policy process.
7. Conclusion
Overall, we have traced how trilogues have become a
politicised law-making institution, and shown how the
EP has become the main driver of this process, primar-
ily through reliance upon a wide range of civil society
organisations, and particularly NGOs. This has been our
main contribution, providing empirical data which is oth-
erwise scarce to find on the role of civil society organi-
sations with trilogues, their relationships with EU insti-
tutions in the process, and whether there are any sys-
tematic biases in these relationships. The EP is able to as-
sert itself viz. the Council of Ministers by using the ‘noisy
politics’ of NGOs, and a wide range of NGOs are repre-
sented through the pluralisation of political parties in the
EP in the trilogue process, such as the Greens or radical
left parties.
Flows of information continue between EU lawmak-
ers and organised interests during the pivotal trilogue
process. Following the premises of politicisation, we
show how civil society organisations have brought a
growing salience to European governance, and an expan-
sion of actors engaged in monitoring EU affairs. Trilogues
themselves, by nature, lend themselves to politicisa-
tion, as an unstable and dynamic institution. The EP is
the most sensitive to the implications of trilogues for
democratic legitimacy, given its role as the people’s tri-
bune, and therefore a driving force in the politicization
of trilogues.
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